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WALTER F. HOFFMANN*

The Substantive Jurisdiction of an
International Criminal Court
In August of 1976, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
rejected a recommendation submitted by the Section of International Law to
approve in principle a convention for the establishment of an International
Criminal Court. The principal reason for the rejection by the House was that the
S.I.L. resolution did not specify or limit the substantive jurisdiction of such a
court.
One delegate expressed the fear that such a court might try United States
officials for their actions in the Viet Nam War. Another speculated that the court
might even try the rescuers at Entebbe instead of the hijackers.
The question of substantive jurisdiction for an International Criminal Court, if
and when one is created, is probably the single most important issue to be
resolved. There are currently three major draft conventions that have been
proposed for the establishment of such a court. Each of them takes a different
approach to the question of jurisdiction.
The 1951 Draft Convention proposed by a seventeen-member special committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations gave jurisdiction to the
court to try persons accused of crimes under international law "as may be
provided in conventions or special agreements among states parties to the present
statute."'
The 1953 Draft Convention proposed by a second special committee of the
General Assembly contains a much broader approach. It gives jurisdiction to the
court over "crimes generally recognized under international law." 2 This would
leave the matter in the hands of the court itself to define what crimes were
generally so recognized.
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The 1972 Draft Convention proposed by the jurists and scholars who met at
Wingspread, Wisconsin, refers to "crimes under international law"; 3 but the
Wingspread scholars also proposed a companion convention to establish an
International Criminal Code. This proposed Code spelled out the following
4
substantive jurisdictional basis for the International Criminal Court:
1. Crimes against peace, against humanity, and war crimes as defined in the
Nuremberg Charter;
2. Genocide;
3.Slavery;
4. Piracy on the high seas;
S.Aircraft hijacking and related offenses;
6. International traffic in drugs;
7. Violation of the Geneva Convention.
A fourth jurisdictional approach is currently under study by the Section of
International Law. This approach would limit the jurisdiction of the court in the
enabling document itself to the crimes of aircraft hijacking, international
terrorism and such other crimes as the parties to the statute might later agree to
by separate convention. The definition of hijacking would, under the new
recommendation of the S.I.L., be limited to that contained in the "Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft" signed at The Hague on
December 15, 1970. Under the Hague Convention, hijacking is defined as the
seizure or exercise of control of certain types of aircraft by force, by threat of
force, or by any other form of intimidation. I The aircraft involved must be of the
non-military type, and the seizure must occur outside the territory of the state of
registration and while in flight. Flight is further defined as after the door is locked
for embarkation and prior to the door being opened for disembarkation. 6
International terrorism would, under the new S.I.L. recommendation, be
limited to the definition of international terrorism contained in the "Draft
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism" proposed by the United States Department of State in November of
1972.' Under that Draft Convention, the crime of international terrorism is
defined as unlawful killing, serious bodily harm or kidnapping that (1) takes
place outside the territory of the state of the alleged offender; (2) takes place
outside the territory of the state against which the act is directed; (3) is not
committed against a member of the armed forces of a state in the course of

'Statute for an International Criminal Court, Article 1, Bellagio-Wingspread Draft.
'Convention on International Crime, Article 3, Bellagio-Wingspread Draft.
'Article 1, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague,
December 15, 1970.
'Ibid., Article 3.
7
Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1972.
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military hostilities; and (4) is intended to damage the interests of or obtain
concessions from a state or an international organization.
Aircraft hijacking and international terrorism have, of course, increased
tremendously in recent years. 8 Many hijackers and terrorists have successfully
evaded prosecution by obtaining asylum in certain countries. The so-called West
German initiative in the United Nations would, if adopted by countries, return
persons accused of hijacking to the country of the hostages. This is unlikely to
occur in practice, since a state whose national committed the offense is likely to be
fearful that the defendant will not receive a fair trial if he is transported back to
the state of the hostages. The corollary of this is that the state of the victim has
reason to fear excessive leniency if the accused persons are tried in a state
sympathetic to the defendants.
The answer to the dual problem of the fear of leniency and lack of a fair trial is
to establish an International Criminal Court to try persons accused of aircraft
hijacking or international terrorism. If after ten or twenty years of experience,
such a court succeeds in these limited areas, its authority could then by a separate
convention be extended to other international crimes.

'See E.

RICH, FLYING SCARED (1972);

InternationalLawyer, VoL 11, No. 2

and J. A. AVRY, SKY

PIRATES

(1972).

